Just Transition Communities Project

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Climate Assemblies and Deliberative Democracy

A Global Best Practice Review

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Contents

Executive Summary

With climate change policies increasingly used as a tool for further political polarisation, it is important to explore tools that could help bring the public on board with climate ambition. Climate assemblies, if done to a high standard, can increase community empowerment while rebuilding legitimacy within policy-making from the view of the general public. Whilst climate assemblies are important it is also vital to research theoretical approaches as well as real-world experience of climate assemblies to develop better understanding of how assembly outputs can effectively develop and legitimise climate policy and support participatory democracy.

This report is developed by the Just Transition Lab at the University of Aberdeen. It is part of the Just Transition Communities Project led by North East Scotland Climate Action Network Hub and funded by the Scottish Government Just Transition Fund. The project plans to explore how communities in the North East Scotland can be involved in and drive the process of designing, creating, and delivering a just transition. This report aims to inform future climate assemblies initiatives, leading to increased community participation in climate change mitigation and adaptation policy.

This report provides a literature review as an introduction to deliberative democracy and climate assemblies. It examines theory and practice in all the relevant aspects of using climate assemblies to increase public awareness of climate change, aid climate policy-making, and increasing the legitimacy and public acceptance of current and future policies. From the design of climate assemblies to participant recruitment, scale, and outcomes – this report provides an overview of theoretical approaches and 14 case studies of climate assemblies to present a rounded view of deliberative democracy in practice.

Introduction

The ambition for net-zero by 2050 requires decision-making that disrupts the status quo. One of these non-conventional strategies is the use of deliberative democracy, in the form of climate assemblies. Deliberative democracy is a relatively new concept where policy issues are addressed through deliberation between communities and governments (Niemeyer, 2013). The use of deliberative democracy can increase the legitimacy of decisions that are made because of the collaborative approach within this type of democracy (Thompson, 2008). The deliberative democracy approach to policy-making is now being applied to climate change mitigation and adaptation policy in the form of climate assemblies. A climate assembly brings together a representative sample of the population to learn about and discuss climate change. During climate assemblies, the members will hear from a range of experts, which present balanced evidence for the participants to discuss. After discussing the evidence, they have heard, the members write up their conclusions in the form of recommendations which are then handed to decision-makers (Climate Assembly UK, no date).

Climate assemblies are an important tool for addressing climate change. If they are done to a high standard, they can increase community empowerment while rebuilding legitimacy within policy-making from the view of the general public (European Climate Foundation, 2021). Whilst climate assemblies are important it is also vital to research good practice for climate assemblies and how best to use their outputs to effectively develop climate policy.

This report is part of the Just Transition Communities Project led by North East Scotland Climate Action Network Hub and funded by the Scottish Government Just Transition Fund. The project is a collaboration among strategic project partners: tsiMoray, University of Aberdeen Just Transition Lab, Aberdeen for a Fairer World, Open Source, Go Deep Scotland, The Community Chartering Network as well as other specialist service providers and allied organisations. The project plans to explore how communities in the North East Scotland can be involved in and drive the process of designing, creating, and delivering a just transition. This report aims to inform future climate assemblies initiatives, leading to increased community participation in climate change mitigation and adaptation policy. to the report delivers a literature review with respect to implementing climate assembly outcomes, engaging decision-makers with this type of democracy, and community empowerment. A survey will be designed and delivered aimed at policy and decision makers and statutory agency on using the outputs of climate assemblies or community deliberative processes. The fin l step is to undertake a conference on how governments respond to climate assemblies and community engagement agenda.

This literature review provides a brief outline of deliberative democracy and how it relates to climate assemblies in section 1. Section 2 explains the design of climate assemblies and how that relates to 14 case studies of climate assemblies which have been undertaken across the world. Following that, section 3 examines the quality of deliberation and how deliberative processes can be most effective. In section 4, the report examines the outcomes of case study climate assemblies . Finally, section 5 provides recommendations accounting for evidence from theory and a real-world context.

Glossary	
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY	A means of addressing issues via deliberation occurring between members of the public and governmental bodies and institutions
DELIBERATION	Slow, thoughtful, considered discussion
CITIZEN ASSEMBLY	The bringing together of members of the public, either recruited voluntarily or demographically chosen, to partake in learning and deliberation in order to inform governmental (and wider public) opinion, decision making and policy
CLIMATE ASSEMBLY	A citizen assembly specifically to address climate-related issues
CASE STUDY	A specific case used to illustrate the topic studied
POLICY	A course of action taken or proposed by the government or an organisation

1 Deliberative Democracy

Deliberative democratic processes take numerous forms, one of which is climate assemblies. 'Deliberative democracy' arose as a concept around the early 1990s and describes the action of addressing issues of public concern via reasoning and deliberative discussion between communities and governmental institutions (Niemeyer, 2013; Cohen, 2007). Deliberative democratic models seek to move away from expert-centred political approaches and instead, include citizens in the creation of public policy (Chambers, 2003). There are many political issues and subject areas where deliberative approaches might be useful – education, bio-medical ethics, energy policy and, most notably within the context of this project, the environment (Chambers, 2003). However, deliberation requires meaningful citizenry inclusion. Cohen (2007) highlights the important difference between 'talking' and 'reasoning'. It is the discussion and weighing of reasons which are to contribute to policy decision-making, which gives citizen panels, such as climate assemblies, their deliberative element rather than being a form for purely 'talking' through the issue. Thus, in order for climate assemblies to be deliberative, there is a 'reason-giving' and justifi ation requirement for the decisions and outcomes made by citizens during climate assemblies (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004; Thompson, 2008). However, it is thought that poor deliberation practices at the national level within political institutions seeps into the public sphere meaning the quality of the deliberation at the local level can be dependent on the quality of deliberation at the national level (Niemeyer, 2013).

The outcomes of deliberative democracy go beyond just policy reform (Thompson, 2008). Supporters of deliberative democracy vouch that the decisions it produces have increased legitimacy due to the involvement of citizens (Thompson, 2008). For public policy to be implemented, it does not require a feeling of legitimacy from citizens (Thompson, 2008). However, by giving communities agency, citizen assemblies transition the issue at hand to more of a collective-identity, common-good issue rather than an issue for 'distrusted governments' to solve (Niemeyer, 2013). A growing disconnect between citizens and political actors has broken down the trust between the two sides (Ryfe, 2005) and so deliberative processes also seek to bridge this gap. Citizen assemblies have been found to produce a long standing 'civic mindedness' and a feeling of participation (Niemeyer, 2013; Thompson, 2008) thus increasing citizenry political engagement. Deliberative democracy also seeks to overcome short-term thinking which is prevalent within modern-day democracies (Willis et al., 2021). Participants of assemblies are supposed to be allowed the time and space to listen, reflect and scrutinise elements of the discussion and therefore, are not rushed into decisions (Willis et al., 2021). Their slow paced, deliberative nature and their ability to enhance civic mindedness and feelings of collective identity are especially benefic al for long-term issues that affect future generations such as climate change.

There are some cognitive barriers to deliberative democracy. When it comes to complex issues, people tend to avoid involvement or responsibility (Ryfe, 2005). People tend to take cognitive shortcuts to make decision-making efficien but at the expense of reflection (Ryfe, 2005). They are also often more than happy to hand over the burden of decision-making responsibilities when issues appear too difficul to solve and therefore, engagement may be difficu . However, citizen assemblies require involvement from those who are less engaged or are too overwhelmed by the issue at hand. If citizen assemblies are purely made up of self-selected participants, they can become dominantly white

and middle-class (Ryfe, 2005) and this threatens the perceived legitimacy of their outcomes. Public policy changes, as a result of citizen assemblies, can only achieve legitimacy if the public believe that the views expressed have been generally representative of the population (Ryfe, 2005).

The prevalence in utilising public participation for climate-related issues means an understanding of how deliberation contributes to policy making is essential (Pallett et al., 2019). Effective climate action requires public participation and support and therefore, public participation in climate policy-making is often vital.

Climate action requires the engagement of seemingly 'banal everyday citizens' (Pallett et al., 2019) because climate adaption and mitigation require collective effort more than other forms of policy such as taxation and foreign policy for example. Public participation is benefic al to aid policy makers in their understanding of how the public use energy in their homes or their choice of transportation when commuting to and from work to facilitate low-carbon transitions (Pallett et al., 2019). Public participation is also benefic al in climate policy to 'bring people on board' with climate action. It can aid feelings of legitimacy of climate policies when people feel that they helped create and influen e citizen-centred policy-making processes (Pallett et al., 2019; Wells et al., 2021). Research suggests that there is growing support for public opinion to guide climate policy-making (Wells et al., 2021). This may be in part due to the moral element of climate action, whereby the public's interests and values become important in their willingness to comply which can often be divided along social, economic, cultural, and political lines (Wells et al., 2021; Dietz and Stern, 2008). Furthermore, studies have found that overcoming resistance to climate policy is harder than overcoming scepticism to climate change, and a lack of public engagement in climate policy has a signifi ant effect on the ability to reduce greenhouse gases (Rode et al., 2021; Lorenzoni et al., 2007). Therefore, including citizens in policy- and decision-making processes can help to overcome this resistance and produce more effective results.

Deliberative processes can also be benefic al to social justice and just transitions. Deliberation involving a representative citizen group can break down political polarisation and provides an opportunity for citizens to consider opposing or alternative viewpoints or social circumstances. Deliberative processes empower citizens across a diverse range of background to ensure all demographics are considered in policy-making (Wells et al., 2021). Deliberative democracy is not in and of itself egalitarian, inclusive, or empowering (Silver, Scott and Kazepov, 2010). Participants are often selected based on levels of deprivation and marginalised groups can be overrepresented in order to ensure their voices are heard amongst others during deliberations (Wells et al., 2021). This is vital as barriers to public engagement with climate change can occur at social as well as individual levels (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). Research indicates that those with lower levels of personal income demonstrate lower levels of environmental engagement (Milfont et al., 2015; Theodori and Luloff, 2002). Other demographic factors contribute to a lack of environmental concern such as older age and lower education level and thus, climate change can often be seen as a 'sectarian' issue (Milfont et al., 205). By deliberately incorporating a range of demographics, deliberation processes can seek to break down sectarianism in climate concern and ensure a more just transition. In response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, informal deliberation occurred within low-income households most directly affected by the typhoon in to discuss issues such as relocation, resources to aid with climate resilience and sustainability and required infrastructure (Willis et al., 2021). However, this contrasted with government-level deliberative talks where only high-level stakeholders were invited to make decisions regarding urban

poor communities excluding and marginalising the affected communities. The exclusion of rural communities in deliberative processes is a common concern amongst the public (Willis et al., 2021). Thus, deliberative processes only ensure a just transition, social justice when they specifi ally include those from marginalised and affected communities. However, participation from marginalised groups is not enough. Power imbalances and inequalities can be reinforced during deliberation if marginalised and affected groups feel they have to conform to more dominant, powerful voices and therefore, bringing these voices 'to the table' alone is not enough (Silver, Scott and Kezepov, 2010). It's also important to ensure diversity and inclusion amongst experts selected to present at climate assemblies. A study conducted by a team of researchers across the University of Strathclyde, Natural Environment Research Council and Glasgow Caledonian University, found no climate assembly across the 23 they studied that had been held in the UK since 2019, reported on the demographics of the experts that presented at each of them and that none had equity, diversity and inclusion targets to supported the inclusion of marginalised voices amongst their experts (Roberts et al., 2022).

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2 The Design of Climate Assemblies

2.1 Climate Assembly Design

There are many ways in which climate assemblies can be designed and conducted. There are lessons and best practices to be learned from the many climate assemblies that have been undertaken around the world. This analysis has considered 14 climate assemblies at different scales to understand how climate assemblies are designed and the outcomes presented after the completion of the climate assembly (see Section 5 for full justifi ation as to why these case studies were chosen) Table 1 below breaks down each assembly and the important aspects of climate assembly design.

Commissioning Body and Agenda Setting

Climate assemblies are mainly used to enable citizens to engage with climate change policy and the direction of this policy in the future. This has led to climate assemblies mainly being commissioned by governments at different levels depending on the scale of the climate assembly. Of the assemblies analysed, most were commissioned by either local councils or national governments. Interestingly, the Scottish climate assembly was commissioned due to the introduction of the Climate Change Act 2019 which made it legal requirement for Scotland to undertake a climate assembly to help shape Scotland's climate policy (Andrews, et al., 2022). Whilst it is most common for governments to commission climate assemblies, they can also be initiated by non-profit organisations, as was the case in for the Washington climate assembly (2021).

It is important to consider how the agendas of climate assemblies are formulated. The remit of a climate assembly can be framed in many ways and climate assembly design can influen e framing. This can be through design processes such as:

> *Topics chosen for consideration, the priority given to the different subjects, the people chosen to communicate the information, the location of the assembly, the amount of time given to the process, the methods employed for deliberation, the mechanisms by which recommendations are chosen and communicated, and the commitment given by policy makers to act on the recommendations that emerge*
>
> *(Shaw, Wang and Latter, 2021).*

These design choices have an influen e on how members interact and discuss climate change policy, and overall will impact the way members come to recommendation decisions based on how the assembly's agenda was framed (Shaw, Wang and Latter, 2021). Within the design of topic focus, climate assemblies can use what is known as top-down or bottom-up approaches when setting agendas. There are advantages and disadvantages with both types of approach. Top-down approach, directed by experts, tends to be more narrowly focused which lends itself to more practical policy recommendations. However, a bottom-up approach allows for a wider scope and affords members of the assembly the opportunity to create their own vision for a carbon-neutral future (Cherry et al. 2021). In general, climate assemblies considered in Table 1, a top-down approach was taken where the commissioning body set the agenda and selected the experts. For example, in the French Citizens' assembly (2017), the Economic, Social and Environmental Council created the agenda. On the other hand, during the Washington Climate Assembly (2021) the agenda was discussed by the participants and voted on. It is possible to use both a top-down and bottom-up approach like with the UK climate assembly where it was mainly top-down, but the design of the assembly allowed for some underpinning principles to be developed by assembly members (Cherry et al. 2021).

2.2 Organisation

The Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WfD) provides a guide on the key principles for completing deliberative democracy (Carson et al., 2021). These principles guide our analysis of case studies climate assemblies' design performance. One of the fi st key principles for successful deliberative democracy is having a clear remit of focus. This is to provide a comprehensible structure for the deliberation and to set boundaries for discussion. Throughout the case studies there were clear remits presented to the members. For example, in Ireland's Citizen Assembly (2018) the remit was established with the question, "How the state can make Ireland a leader in tackling climate change". This provided the assembly with an unambiguous goal of what was to be achieved by members. This remit creation theme was present throughout the case studies when the remit question was presented to the assemblies.

The next fundamental step to climate assembly design is ensuring transparency in the process so that external bodies can understand how the climate assembly came to be. This is to increase the legitimacy of the process and to prove that the design of the climate assembly is robust. Everything that is produced before and after the assembly should be made public and available for scrutiny. The UK Climate Assembly (2020) report highlighted the importance of transparency and laid out steps taken to ensure that all the information that was provided to the assembly was available for scrutiny. Transparency was a key aspect that came up when analysing the case studies and proof that climate assemblies were taking adequate steps. When undertaking future climate assemblies, transparency should be a key requirement to ensure that the assembly is seen as legitimate.

The next principle according to the WfD, is involving diverse information in assembly process. It is essential in a deliberative democracy setting that information is provided from trusted sources and people with specific expertise in the subject area. There should be opportunities for members to ask questions and receive additional information that may be required. In every climate assembly which was analysed there was availability of expert sources about climate change, and relevant information was given to the participants. The North of Tyne Climate Assembly (2021) had an extensive list of experts within different fie ds to effectively distribute information to the members and answer any questions. This is consistent with the rest of the climate assemblies analysed.

The next three principles of conducting deliberative democracy are democratic lottery, adequate time, and influen e. These will be discussed in later sections of this analysis as they are closer to the overall considerations of a climate assembly and deliberative democracy processes and not the internal design process. The next principle to be discussed in terms of internal organisation is to consider the dialogue and deliberations. The deliberation process should not be centred around debate but aim to find common ground among the members to facilitate discussions and help formulate the recommendations. The WfD suggests that voting should be avoided, if possible, to make sure that the conversation is kept open. However, this is not always the case – e.g. in the Oxford Citizens' Assembly on Climate Change (2019) the members voted on scenarios to advise their recommendations, although this still produced meaningful recommendations.

Finally, the ability of the assembly members to have a free response to the challenge of climate change, is an essential feature of a successful climate assembly. Members should not just be critically evaluating the government's response to climate change, but they should be able to create their own recommendations based on the knowledge that they have acquired. This was a characteristic of many of the climate assemblies where assembly members created entirely new recommendations to be review by government rather than just assessing what that government is currently doing. In the French Climate Assembly (2022), 149 proposals were made to the French government based entirely on what members felt would have the most drastic effect on tackling climate change. The one assembly which did not make any specific recommendations was the Global Climate Assembly (2022). This assembly was a preliminary global assembly to investigate whether it was possible to hold an assembly which incorporated members across the globe.

2.3 Recruitment

Typically, climate assemblies are best made up of, and usually seek to recruit, approximately 100 members (Newcastle University, 2022). There are two primary options when recruiting for climate assemblies. Firstly, citizens can be recruited voluntarily, or they can be randomly and representatively selected (Ryfe, 2005). When citizens self-select as participants in response to advertising initiatives and so on, this often produces a "snowball effect" (Ryfe, 2005). Individuals interested in participating inform and, thus, bring in participants from their social networks and these individuals do likewise until the group is composed of 'snowballed' participants from similar social networks. Although this eases and cheapens the recruitment process for organisers, it can result in unvarying participants and homogenous groups (Ryfe, 2005). Self-selecting participants tend to be civically and politically engaged already and tend to be white, university-educated, and middle-class (Ryfe, 2005). A lack of diversity within the participants of climate assemblies not only harms the legitimacy of the outcomes, but also the quality of the deliberation. In comparison, when a group is made up of strangers, particularly those with diverse ideas, participants are found to be more open to differing opinions, more likely to engage in deeper discussions and learn from one another (Ryfe, 2005). Groups from similar or the same social circles avoid open political confli t (Ryfe, 2005). Furthermore, when a primary purpose of deliberative democracy is to encourage civic engagement, if those participating are already civically engaged then self-selected climate assemblies become 'a consequence' rather than 'a catalyst of democratic socialisation' (Ryfe, 2005).

As a result of the limitations of self-selection listed above, random and representative sampling can often be favoured by climate assembly organisers (Ryfe, 2005). This approach is supposed to ensure that, if the group is diverse enough, a wider range of viewpoints of the general population should

be represented. If members are representatively selected, there will also be stronger 'public buy in' for the outcomes (Sandover et al., 2021). Policy changes that appear more radical will achieve legitimacy only if they appear to stem from a demographically diverse group (Sandover et al., 2021). However, the idea of citizen assemblies being representative of the wider population, even if selected randomly, is flawed. Citizen assemblies comprise of small group of people in comparison to wider communities and therefore, cannot represent all the views that exist within them (Ryfe, 2005; Smith and Wales, 2000). Furthermore, the representativeness approach of recruitment can lead to 'false essentialisms' (Smith and Wales, 2000). Representatives of each criterion can be misleadingly assumed to represent all the views that would exist within it, e.g., this approach would suggest younger participants are expected to represent all young people within the wider, general population. Additionally, this approach assumes that most participants will make decisions based purely on their demographic and will think similarly to others with similar characteristics outwith the group rather than acknowledging the possibility that participants may learn and alter their views based on the deliberation (Smith and Wales, 2000). The distinction must be made whether participants are tasked to deliberate or represent. Abramson (2000), when discussing legal juries, highlights the subtle difference between jurors being encouraged to think outside their demographics whilst also encouraging the consideration of their own experiences and background and those of the community they represent. Additionally, the question arises of which communities climate assemblies are attempting to represent. Should climate assemblies be comprised of a sample of the general population, or should greater allocation be given to those communities which are most directly affected by potential outcomes (Smith and Wales, 2000)?

There exists a paradox in two of the very core principles of deliberative democracy; the need for learning and the representativeness of the participants (Ryfe, 2005). Participation in climate assemblies requires learning in so much that participants are suitably prepared to discuss their views on the matter. Furthermore, it is a side effect of citizen juries that participants will learn from one another. Once this learning has occurred, participants no longer represent the general public in that they are more knowledgeable than the communities they are supposed to represent (Ryfe, 2005). Thus, any outcomes from the deliberation cannot be said to be representative of the wider population as the views of members have 'evolved as a result of the process' (Duvic-Paoli, 2022). In the UK, Devon Climate Assembly stakeholders overcame this by running an extensive communications and media campaign in conjunction with the assembly (Sandover et al., 2021). Thus, the wider population of Devon could be educated on the developments of the assembly at much and such the same level as those participating. Smith and Wales (2000) suggest climate assembly recruitment should strive for inclusivity rather than representativeness meaning a diverse group of participants is created to ensure certain groups are not 'systematically excluded' but that each participant is never expected to be a representative of any wider demographic group. Furthermore, measures must be taken to avoid inequalities due to factors such as race, ethnicity, culture and gender, occurring during the deliberation (Rojon et al., 2019).

It is important to consider the representation in assembly processes and should be designed into selection. This can include criteria such as age, ethnicity, gender, social background, urban/rural dwelling, and education. Random and representative sampling ensures that those who are not concerned about climate change or are not engaged in the issue are involved in the deliberation process in order to ensure all viewpoints are represented. As such, attitude towards climate change is in

most instances checked for and considered when selecting participants. Random selection is known to be an expensive and time-consuming means of recruitment for climate assemblies. Cash incentives can be offered to encourage participation, particularly amongst those who are disengaged. Climate Assembly UK (CAUK) gave 110 participants £150 per weekend session (of which there were 3) and covered expenses such as travel and childcare costs (Knoca, 2022). Similarly, organisers of Germany's Citizens' Assembly on Climate (Bügerrat klima) gave 160 members €450 for their participation. Although this incentivises participation, monetary incentives which tend to accompany random recruitment processes are incredibly costly. When members of a climate assembly are self-selected, monetary incentives are not as necessary as participants are more likely already invested and wish to contribute to the deliberation making the recruitment process far cheaper. Furthermore, a survey indicated that the transparency of the recruitment process is vital to ensure legitimacy amongst the wider public (Sandover et al., 2021).

Both approaches have certain benefits whilst simultaneously having signifi ant drawbacks. Randomised, representative selection is most commonly used when recruiting members (KNOCA, 2022) but deliberative theorists tend to agree that the primary aim of deliberative participation should be equality regardless of whether participants are recruited voluntarily or via representative selection processes (Ryfe, 2005). They argue that should equality be achieved, so too will the legitimacy of the outcomes amongst the general population.

2.4 Scale

Climate assemblies can be conducted at any scale, whether that's local level or as far as global scale. Many of the assemblies analysed here were undertaken at the local level with participants within that local context. However, the example of the Global Citizens' Assembly on the Climate and Ecological Crisis (Global Assembly Team, 2022) attempted to conduct an assembly at the global level which had never been attempted before. The goal is to eventually scale this process up to include 10 million global citizens by 2030, this is an ambitious target but will mean that the members of a global climate assembly will be more representative of the world population. The scaling of climate assemblies is difficul as climate action requires a truly 'glocal' response, meaning it is an issue that requires both large-scale, global action as well as local and regional responses (Duvic-Paoli, 2022). Various climate assemblies have dealt with this differently, some have kept outcomes in the confines of state power whilst others have brought recommendations both upward to the supranational and downward to the local level (Duvic-Paoli, 2022).

2.5 Online vs. In-person

A signifi ant part of the design process for climate assemblies is whether they are conducted in-person or are entirely online. There is debate among scholars as to which type of deliberation creates the most impact on reaching decisions and facilitating discussion between participants. There are benefits and drawbacks to both forms of deliberation. Some of the benefits of holding these types of deliberation online include recruitment, reducing barriers to entry, and widening the pool of speakers and experts. However, face-to-face deliberation has the benefit of being less awkward, increasing participant bonding, and demanding less effort from facilitators (King and Wilson, 2022). At the core, communication is the fundamental mechanism for the success of climate assemblies whether the assembly is held in-person or online. Overall, online formats capture the essential aspects of in-person assemblies. The benefit of easier access to participation for more geographically diverse populations, should be considered when deciding whether the assembly should be online or in-person (Willis et al, 2021).

Most climate assemblies analysed took place online but some, like the UK climate assembly, were forced online due to the pandemic (UK Government, 2020). Online sessions help reduce the costs of climate assemblies and make it easier for them to run over a longer period (Newcastle University, 2022). Considering that online assemblies have worked well and capture fundamental aspects of face-to-face deliberation process, hosting climate assemblies online does not have a signifi ant impact on the outputs of a climate assembly (Newcastle University, 2022).

2.6 Timing

Due to the nature of climate assembly design, they can be time-consuming processes. Given the sheer complexity of climate change policy, climate assemblies can be signifi antly time-constrained primarily due to budget limits (Elstub et al. 2021). Meeting the needs of the climate assembly and ensuring that as much is covered, in potentially limited time, is a signifi ant challenge to the overall design of a climate assembly. Ideally, climate assemblies should run for as long as is feasible (considering both budgetary constraints and participant availability) as research has found that the quality of deliberation gets better as climate assemblies progress and as participants become more knowledgeable on the issues being discussed (Newcastle University, 2022).

Within the climate assemblies which were analysed many took place over multiple weekends either consecutively or over several months. The example of the Devon Climate Assembly (2021) was conducted in nine days over the space of two months, allowing participants to reflect on what they had learned, to reflect on the group discussions, and formulate their recommendations. On the other hand, the Irish Citizen Assembly (2017) took place over two non-consecutive weekends, but this was due to the climate change policy deliberation being part of a larger citizens' assembly on other issues facing the Irish government. The Climate Assembly UK was conducted across six weekends over the course of 5 months (between January and May 2020) (Newcastle University, 2022).

Flexibility is important within the timing aspect of climate assembly design. In the French Citizens' Assembly, there was originally six sessions scheduled but due to pension reform strikes and the pandemic, sessions were delayed, and the assembly was extended to seven sessions to ensure there was adequate time for the participants to reach their fin l recommendations (Economic, Social and Environmental Council, 2020). The Irish Citizen Assembly (2017) is an example where flexibility was required as the commissioners believed that the topic was extremely broad, so a second weekend was needed to ensure the topic was sufficien y discuss by members. It is recommended that if climate assemblies are conducted via a mix of online and in-person sessions, this can facilitate them lasting over a longer period (Newcastle University, 2022).

Table 1 – Design Breakdown Of Climate Assembly Case Studies

Climate Assembly	Who Commissioned	Who sets agenda	Who are participants	How are they Organised	Online / In person	Timing	Scale
UK Climate Assembly (2020)	Six select committees of the House of Commons	Assembly members – Group discussion and ballot	Civic lottery, representative sample of UK population (110 members)	Rigid structure – expert panel, discussion, voting on principles	In Person / Online	6 weekends (meant to be four, pandemic extended the CA)	National
Scotland's Climate Assembly (2021)	Scottish Parliament (The Climate Change Act 2019)	Stewarding group – 22 experts across a wide range of disciplines with members given the opportunity to discuss the CA question	Largely representative of Scottish population (106 members)	Learning phase from balanced, accurate and comprehensive sources. Incorporated the children's parliament, discussion and deliberation phase, recommendation creation phase.	Online	7 weekends	National
French Citizens' Climate Assembly (2019/2020)	French Parliament	Economic, social and environmental council	Random selection that is representative of the French population	Expert panel, discussions in thematic groups. Proposal writing session, voting phase.	In Person / Online	Seven Sessions (Originally six sessions but pension reform strikes and pandemic delayed sessions)	National
Ireland's Citizen Assembly (2018)	Irish Parliament	Steering group – chairperson, secretariat and representative group of members elected by the wider assembly	Representative of Irish society (99 Members)	Initial meetings and discussions with an expert advisory panel.	In Person	2 weekends (Originally one weekend but topic is extremely broad)	National

Climate Assembly	Who Commissioned	Who sets agenda	Who are participants	How are they Organised	Online / In person	Timing	Scale
Washington Climate Assembly (2021)	People's voice on Climate	Participant discussion and voting on CA principles	Representative of the state of Washington (77 participants)	Rigid structure – learning phase, deliberative phase, voting phase	Online	7 weeks	State Level
Brighton and Hove (2020)	Brighton and Hove City Council	City Council (focussed on transport)	Representative of demographics of Brighton and Hove (50 participants)	Initial session considered engaging members and ensuring they were comfortable. Followed by a learning phase. Deliberation phase a month after learning phase to allow for reflection. Final session discuss and agree headline recommendations	Online	5 sessions	Local
Devon Climate Assembly (2021)	Devon Climate Emergency	Involve (public participation charity)	Random representative sample for the population of Devon	Rigid structure – learning phase, discussion focussed on developing dialogue, deliberation phase, voting phase (if needed)	Online	9 days spread over 2 months	Local

Table 2 – (Continued) Design Breakdown 0f Climate Assembly Case Studies

Climate Assembly	Who Commissioned	Who sets agenda	Who are participants	How are they Organised	Online / In person	Timing	Scale
The North of Tyne Citizens' Assembly on Climate Change (2021)	North of Tyne Combined Authority	Oversight panel - wide range of stakeholders and experts	Civic lottery, random stratified sampling. Representative of the population for the area (50 Participants)	Ice breaking session, learning phase, thematic prioritisation, thematic discussion, recommendation writing, fin lise recommendations	Online	30 hours spread over one month	Local
Global Citizens' Assembly on the Climate and Ecological Crisis (2022)	Global Assembly	The knowledge and Wisdom Advisory Committee / Global Governance and Participation Advisory Committee	Global civic lottery – random sortition sample (100 Participants)	5 Blocks – understanding current situation, reviewing scenarios, pathways and principles, developing submissions to COP26, participation and observation at COP26, review commitments and future agenda setting	Online	20 sessions over 12 weeks (68 hours)	Global
Oxford Citizens' Assembly on Climate Change (2019)	Oxford City Council	Oxford City Council / Ipsos MORI	Demographically representative of the city (50 members)	Expert panel presentations, group discussion in the fi st weekend. Deliberation and voting phase in second weekend.	In Person	2 weekends	Local
Manchester Community Assembly (2021)	Envirolution	Envirolution and external workshop providers	Representatives from across Manchester (108 members)	Expert workshops followed by group discussions to determine mandate and then fin l workshops with local governmental and business representatives	In Person	7 weekly sessions	Local

Climate Assembly	Who Commissioned	Who sets agenda	Who are participants	How are they Organised	Online / In person	Timing	Scale
The Citizen Assembly on Climate (German) (2021)	Scientists for Future	BürgerBegehren Klimaschutz e.V.	Representative of the German Population (160 participants)	Expert panel with learning and discussion phase. Randomly assigned smaller working groups to specific opic. Development of recommendations with the aid of experts. Finally voting phase with recommendations that reached a majority passed to policymakers.	Online	12 sessions	National
Lebanon Climate Assembly (2020)	University College, London and Ebla Research Collective, Beirut independent of governmental institutions	Not disclosed	33 representatively selected members (reduced from 70 due to COVID-19 and social distancing measures)	Learning phase from experts followed by deliberation amongst smaller subgroups of 8-9 members led by an expert facilitator	In person / Online	5 sessions across 3 days	Local
The Kendal Climate Change Citizens' Jury (2021)	Kendal Council	Oversight Panel – local stakeholders	20 residents of Kendal	Learning and expert presentation phase, constant reflection throughout the sessions, discussion phase and initial creation of recommendations, fin lisation of the recommendations. A voting round took place and indicate support for each recommendation	Online	10 sessions for total of 26 hours	Local

3 Quality/Effectiveness of Deliberation

Psychologists have found that people take cognitive shortcuts to reach judgments; particularly political ones such as group affi ation, political ideologies, perceptions of political candidates etc. (Ryfe, 2005). These shortcuts often make these decisions unconscious and ill-thought-out – unconscious bias (Ryfe, 2005). Even when people are working in group settings, these cognitive shortcuts can occur (Ryfe, 2005). Individuals within group settings reach conclusions via shortcuts such as perceiving and following group consensus (Sunstein, 2002; Ryfe, 2005) or being influen ed by strong group leaders (Nye and Simonetta, 1996; Ryfe, 2005). Furthermore, people tend to strive to avoid confli t and therefore, are more agreeable in group settings (Ryfe, 2005). Thus, deliberation, which requires well-thought-out, deliberate decision making, goes against these social and cognitive norms with which people usually reach decisions. As a result, deliberation can often cause anxiety, hesitance and frustration amongst participants, particularly when the issues often deliberated are complex and it is accepted that there are no easy conclusions (Ryfe, 2005). This is a disconcerting side-effect of deliberation as this difficu y experienced by participants can often lead to animosity towards the outcomes of the deliberation (Ryfe, 2005). However, researchers have found suitable contexts in which people tend to embrace more deliberative thought. Firstly, motivation contributes to better deliberation as if participants believe the outcomes of the deliberation will be implemented and powerful, there is more effort placed on ensuring decisions are right (Taber et al., 2001; Ryfe, 2005). Secondly, accountability contributes to better deliberation. When group discussions are held publicly, people tend to think and process information objectively (Tetlock, 1985; Ryfe, 2005). And lastly, diverse groups tend to enhance deliberative conversation (Ryfe, 2005). All of this concludes that the context in which deliberation occurs is vital to ensure it is of high quality and produces optimal outcomes which can then be taken forward in policy. It also further contributes to the legitimacy of the decisions reached amongst participants and the wider public, if they feel that they have reached the best possible conclusions.



4 Outcomes and Policy Influen e of Climate Assemblies

4.1 Climate Assembly Themes

Table 2 below shows breakdown of the common themes presented from the recommendations of different climate assemblies. Using previous climate assemblies to analyse themes which are produced can help the design process of any future climate assemblies. Many common themes, recurring across the climate assemblies, will be discussed here relating to the outcomes of climate assemblies.

One of the main themes consistently present throughout the climate assemblies analysed was the need for **education and information** about climate change and policy. Education is one of the key tools to tackle climate change and it will be fundamental in mitigating its effects and adapting. Through education people are made aware of the environmental problem, the detrimental effects of climate change and how best to address the problems (Wals and Benavot, 2017). There is a desire within the recommendations of climate assemblies to increase education to meet our climate goals. If education is a theme that comes up within deliberative processes consistently, this should encourage governments to distribute education resources informing citizens of the magnitude of climate change-related issues. Many of the climate assemblies were focused on similar themes throughout their process. These themes were climate policy issues in sectors such as energy, transportation, and agriculture. There is no surprise that these themes continue to present themselves, considering Keeping in mind that a major part of the assembly process incorporates expert presentations and information-sharing, it is no surprise that themes encompass areas most pressing to address to better our chances of successfully addressing climate change.

Another common theme amongst the climate assemblies is the need for community involvement throughout the climate policy discourse, including recommending better communication to the wider public about both climate assemblies and the issues surrounding climate change. Community involvement within the context of climate change is vital and is seen to be one of the fundamental parts of resilience (Bahadur, Ibrahim and Tanner, 2013). The assembly members in the case studies analysed often supported community involvement and were aware of how important it is to tackling climate change. For example, members of the Devon Climate Assembly (2021) recommended that communities need to be involved in a greater capacity than they currently are when climate change adaptation and mitigation are concerned.

4.2 Policy/Government response to climate assemblies

The effect that climate assemblies can have on policy varies. The analysed present a wide range of successes, but also some limitations. There are many different reasons why climate assemblies can or cannot impact policy change, from wider public support for climate policy after a climate assembly to limitations on local councils' power to implement recommendations presented to them. Table 2 below gives an overview of the policy-makers' response to climate assemblies in each case study. This section will review the case studies previously mentioned and analyse what is deemed to be a success in terms of influencing poli y and wider impact.

Citizen assemblies are often thought to be of benefit because they produce ambitious yet realistic outcomes (Duvic-Paoli, 2022). Both climate assemblies in the UK (Climate Assembly UK) and France (Citizen's Convention for Climate) produced far more ambitious policies than those proposed by politicians, yet a survey indicated that 62% of the French population found the policies to be 'realistic and effective' (Mellier and Wilson, 2020). Outcomes of climate assemblies can be used to either directly inform policy-making or indirectly influen e policy by informing or providing recommendations to policy-makers (Duvic-Paoli, 2022; Garry et al., 2021). For the most part, citizen assemblies are used to provide recommendations and provide an advisory role to policy-makers and are thus, often loosely connected to policymaking (Rojon et al., 2019; Setälä, 2011). Furthermore, it is often difficul to prove the influen e of climate assemblies on policy as it is often thought that regardless of participatory involvement, these policies would have been put in place (Wells et al., 2021).

There are several forms climate assembly objectives can take (Duvic-Paoli, 2022):

Type of policy	Examples
Economic	Public investment, tax incentive
Regulatory	Sanctions, prohibitions, regulations
Educational	Circulation or emphasis on education in order to influence individual behavioural change

Policy interventions

Climate assemblies can have an impact on future climate policy from the recommendations that are produced from assembly members. Not only can climate assemblies be an important aspect of climate policy but with commitment to outputs increases the legitimacy of climate assemblies, allowing for continuous use of climate assemblies as a means of addressing the climate crisis (Stasiak, et al., 2021). The main goal of a climate assembly is for members of the general public to have influen e on climate policy which directly affects them. It is then important to consider climate assemblies that have taken place to see whether they are achieving this goal.

There are examples where climate assemblies have led to changes in policy to benefit climate change mitigation and adaptation. A localised example can be found in the response from the Oxford City Council after their climate assembly. The assembly led to the announcement of a climate emergency budget and engaging directly with the assembly to address all the recommendations that were suggested. The Council made it clear that they would provide support for individuals and communities to tackle the climate emergency (Oxford City Council, 2019). This example demonstrates that willingness to engage with the assembly recommendation policy can be implemented to increase a local areas' ability to tackle the climate emergency and benefit communities that may be affected by the adverse effects of climate change.

At larger scales, for example the Irish Citizens' Assembly, citizen participation can lead to policy change, in which the government will take on board the recommendations from the assembly and use those to inform future policy interventions. In the Irish case, the recommendations were taken forward to produce Ireland's climate plan (Coleman et al. 2019). Climate assemblies can be a useful tool for governments to understand what the people that they govern want from climate policy and help guide them in the best ways to tackle climate change. If climate assemblies lead to direct policy change and action from governments like in the two examples here, the legitimacy of climate assemblies as a tool in the arsenal of governments increases. Action on the recommendations of climate assemblies is fundamental to their success. Otherwise they can be seen as 'tokenistic' – a way for governments to look like they have considered the views of the public (Wells, 2019). Therefore, it is important for governments to seriously consider the recommendations presented to them by the assembly allowing for climate assemblies to become a legitimate process when creating climate policy to benefit the citizens. It is possible to influen e policy through these deliberative processes but there are other reasons as to why a climate assembly is a good idea for a government to undertake.

Garry et al. (2021) found signifi ant support from the public for decisions made by citizens' assemblies, even if they produced decisions with which they disagreed. Amongst politicians, legitimacy is placed on climate assembly outcomes when they produce recommendations for policy and there tends to be little support among politicians for citizen assembly outcomes that directly impact policy (Garry et al., 2021). A 2019 study found that most politicians had a positive view of a recent climate assembly but that a far smaller number wished for its outcomes to be binding (Niessen, 2019). Often reasons behind this can be the lack of trust in the capacity of lay citizens to formally contribute to policy-making (Neissen, 2019). Political actors can often feel like climate assemblies undermine an elected governments' authority and are therefore, not legitimate (Girard, 2021). However, climate assemblies earn their legitimacy by being far more diverse and representative than the make-up of many elected governments. They can also help ensure immunity from partisan breakdowns, electoral cycles and political partiality (Girard, 2021). However, if not seen as legitimate by political actors,

their perceived legitimacy amongst the wider public can also be threatened (Girard, 2021) and therefore, political support is vital.

4.3 Public Engagement

Climate assemblies have a positive impact on public engagement and support for ambitious policy interventions (Muradova, Walker and Colli, 2019) depending on how much the wider public is informed about the assembly (Kuntze and Fesenfeld, 2021). Climate assemblies also have a signifi ant impact on participants' perceived expectations of how climate would influen e their communities which leads to an increase in support for action on climate change. The design process of climate assemblies, featuring a diverse group with an intensive education component and a focus on policy recommendation development, can have a useful impact on breaking down the complexities of climate mitigation and adaptation (Myers, Ritter and Rockway, 2017). Helping to simplify the topic of climate change policy has the potential to increase public engagement and decrease barriers to discussions about climate.

The outcomes of citizen assemblies go beyond direct or indirect influen e on policy-making. They increase civic participation, encourage deliberate thought and decision-making, harness empathy to opposing views and pursue prioritisation of common goals over individual wishes (Rojon et al., 2019). Climate assemblies are thought to rebalance the influen e of decision-making on climate policy as influen es come from top-down and bottom-up streams (Wells et al., 2021). However, climate assemblies can often miss opportunities for wider public engagement by not engaging them through the momentum of the climate change deliberation occurring (Wells et al., 2021). Citizens who participate in climate assemblies can act as 'information proxies' for the wider public taking on the role usually reserved for journalism, and act as a sort of 'civic immune system' (Niemeyer, 2020). Whilst there is debate on the direct impact of climate assemblies on policy, they have been found to increase public discourse on climate-related issues (Duvic-Paoli, 2022).

There are suggestions that citizen assemblies can be used as a proxy to the general public to increase public engagement and that climate assemblies are a source of trusted information in a discourse space that can be incredibly complex, leading to more conscious citizens in a changing climate (Devaney, et al., 2020). Therefore, continuing to hold climate assemblies after the initial assembly is key to increasing public engagement with climate change. After the climate assembly in Oxford (2019) the Council committed to holding a net-zero carbon Oxford summit to increase the engagement of the wider public and keep the conversation going about how important it was for citizens to be aware and educated on the subject of climate change. Not only do climate assemblies have some impact on climate policy, but they are a way to engage the general public to ensure that climate change policy is on the minds of lay people.

4.4 Limitations

Whilst there are benefits to climate assemblies for the impact directly on climate policy and indirect benefits, there are many examples where recommendations are not followed up on by the governments or are watered down. It has been suggested that deliberative democracy has limited impact on the political process and policy-making (Michels and Binnema, 2019). In the example of the French Climate Assembly (2021), only 10% of the recommendations were implemented without any revisions, compared to 53% that were rejected (Courant, 2021). Considering that this was an assembly commissioned by the President of France, the direct impact on policy fell short of the aim of the climate assembly. Without any mechanism to bind the government to the recommendations presented, there is no guarantee that any recommendations formulated will have any influen e on policy change.

There are some climate assemblies undertaken by governments with the intention of producing tangible change to policy but in the end, nothing ever comes after the climate assembly has taken place. For example, the Washington Climate Assembly (2021) produced a full document with 140 recommendations but there has been limited response to these from the Washington State Council. The recommendations were sent to the State legislature but there is little evidence to suggest that any of the recommendations from the climate assembly were ever implemented by the State Government. This can also be seen in the policy impacts of the Citizen Assembly on Climate (2021) in Germany, although the process has arguably increased the legitimacy of deliberative democracy with plans to undertake further climate assemblies (Stack and Griessler, 2022). The lack of impact can be down to the infancy of using citizen participation but the benefit of increasing its legitimacy is important if this stream of policy-making continues its current path. There is evidence to suggest that deliberative process can improve environmental outcomes and change the expectations of citizens from a problem for 'distrusted governments' to an issue for the community to address, creating a government-community partnership (Niemeyer, 2013).

4.5 Policy Power

One of the potential barriers to the implementation of climate assembly recommendations is the ability of the commissioning government to make changes to current policy without the influen e of national governments/legislatures. This can be seen clearly in the Scottish example, due some of the recommendations coming under the UK Government remit, the Scottish Government has committed to contacting the UK Government about the recommendations (Andrews et al., 2022). This shows that even if governments have the political will to follow through, political power structures may hinder the climate assembly's progress. This was also the case for the locally-based Kendal Climate Citizens' Jury (2021) where councillors were committed to implementing the recommendations but there were limitations on their political power to implement. There is a clear need for policy integration between all levels of government. Local and sub-national governments face challenges in implementing policy changes due to the local governments' remit constraint (Measham, et al., 2011). This is a problem that more localised climate assemblies must address to ensure that they are aligned with higher powers of government, which can hamper how ambitious local climate assemblies can be with their recommendations. However, there are opportunities for recommendations to influen e different levels of government on how to appropriately tackle climate change coming directly from some of the people that these governments serve.

A primary hurdle to implementing climate assembly outcomes is the short-term thinking of governments. Duvic-Paoli (2022) argues that our political and legal institutions are not built to deal with the governance of the future and instead are only conceived to deal with issues of the now. Thus, they are ill-equipped to implement climate assembly outcomes that seek to protect future generations. Governments can demonstrate reluctance due to their limited time in office which means they tend to prioritise shorter-term goals (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). However, climate assemblies are thought to improve this short-term thinking by encouraging careful and deliberate conversation and consideration about the future (Duvic-Paoli, 2022).

The impact of the outcomes of climate assemblies, when made clear to participants, alters the relationship between the assembly and political actors/the executive. For example, climate assemblies where participants are told they are assuming an advisory role to policy-makers have a vastly different relationship to executive branches than those who are told outcomes will directly

impact policy (Duvic-Paoli, 2022). For example, President Macron promised that the outcomes of the Citizens' Convention for Climate in France would be delivered to the Parliament, 'sans filt e' (without fil er) which resulted in a "more tense and more complex relationship with the government" (Duvic-Paoli, 2022; pp. 254; Mellier and Wilson, 2020). The outcomes of the Citizens' Convention for Climate in France were translated into policy; however, they were done so with considerable caveats which seemed to discredit the 'without fil er' promise (Duvic-Paoli, 2022). Furthermore, the perception was that President Macron was accused of simply 'cherry-picking' the policies he most supported (Mellier and Wilson, 2020). 'Politics' seems to halt the implementation of climate assembly outcomes even if it has the support of policy-makers (Mellier and Wilson, 2020). Some of these political hurdles occur due to short-term thinking of political institutions and the lack of clear benefits to democratic parties and governments (Mellier and Wilson, 2020). Issues also emerge when climate assemblies are scaled up from local to more national arenas. There is a risk that when local climate assemblies are scaled up, they purely become discourse-making tools rather than contributing to decision-making (Niemeyer, 2020). However, if they can frame wider public debate then this can still be benefic al despite the perceived lack of concrete outcomes. The most substantial risk when scaling up climate assemblies is their vulnerability to manipulation as they can be "used as an agent for hegemonic power" and thus distorted as they scale up (Niemeyer, 2020).

'Coupling' is the term used for the linkage that exists between citizens and governance/elites during deliberative processes (Hendricks, 2016). The strength of this coupling is important and can alter the outcomes and quality of the deliberation. Loose coupling is thought to be best as if coupling is too tight then there can be assimilation between both political actors and citizens and thus, neither learns from the other (Hendricks, 2016). However, if decoupled, governmental sites of deliberation and citizen-based sites of deliberation will ignore one another (Hendricks, 2016).

One difficu y of implementing climate assembly policy recommendations could be the polycentricity of climate change. Any policy/law on climate change mitigation is bound to relate to a specific sector of economy with already existing set of regulations and policy, eg energy, agriculture or transport. Therefore, implementation of climate assembly recommendations could require far-reaching reforms across multiple sectors of economy which is not always feasible as a response to the assembly.

Table 2 – Outcomes of Climate Assembly Case Studies

	Recommendations / Output	Themes	Response
UK Climate Assembly (2020)	Over 50 Recommendations	Education and Information, Fairness, Freedom of Choice, Co-benefits, and N ture	Independent evaluation of the climate assembly (Elstub S. et al., 2021).
Scotland Climate Assembly (2021)	16 goals and 81 recommendations – Challenged government to commit to annual check-ins (Scottish Government, 2021).	Resources, building quality, retrofit homes, s andards and regulation, public transport, travel emissions, carbon labelling, Education, Land Use, communities, circular economy, work and volunteering, business, 20-minute communities, taxation (Scottish Government, 2021)	Creation of a scorecard system with 10 key performance indicators to increase accountability. Comprehensive response from the government but unclear effect on policy. Some recommendations are under UK government remit which government has committed to contacting about these recommendations (Andrews et al., 2022)
Ireland's Citizens' Assembly (2018)	13 recommendations	Governance, Social Policy, Infrastructure, Energy (Community ownership), Nature, and Transportation	Special parliamentary committees were established to take forward the recommendations from the assembly. The committees helped create policy change in the form of Ireland's climate plan (Coleman et al. 2019).
French Climate Assembly (2019/2020)	149 proposals (Giraudet, 2022)	Transport and mobility, Consumption, Living and households, Labour and production, and the Food Sector	10% of recommendations were implemented without modifi ations, 37% were watered down or modified, and 53% were rejected. Government was graded a 3 out 10 on their follow up of the recommendations by the assembly members (Courant, 2021)
Washington Climate Assembly (2021)	140 recommendations	Transportation, Buildings, Energy, Natural Solutions, Circular Economies, Social Policies, and Governance	Limited follow up and response from the Washinton state council
Brighton and Hove Climate Assembly (2020)	10 recommendations	Focus of transportation	Physical barriers to the implementation of assembly recommendations, such as infrastructure. Non-physical barriers include those of addressing expectations and habits that citizens in Brighton and Hove experience (Carrol, et al. 2020)

	Recommendations / Output	Themes	Response
Devon Climate Assembly (2021)	20 key principles and 14 resolutions	Transport and mobility, Buildings and Energy. Key messages produced included: Communications and Information, Community involvement and engagement, Urgency, Ambition, Governance, and Accountability (Scott, 2021)	The Devon Climate Emergency Partnership has developed responses to add the recommendations in the Devon Carbon Plan (Devon City Council, 2022).
The North of Tyne Citizens' Assembly on Climate Change (2021)	30 Recommendations	Housing, Transport, Energy System, and Nature	Recommendations were considered depending on if they could be implemented, require collaboration, or involve influencing overnment
Global Citizens' Assembly on the Climate and Ecological Crisis (2022)	No specific ecommendations		Aim to invite ten million people to participate in a global climate assembly by 2030.
Oxford Citizens' Assembly on Climate Change (2019)	Voted on scenarios which were ranked from the most ambitious to less ambitious interventions	Transport, Waste Reduction, Buildings, Biodiversity, Renewable Energy. Key messages to council from members – More ambition, limited awareness to current policy before assembly, communication to citizens is needed, more education and information to wider public	Council announced Climate emergency budget, council would be net-zero by 2020, respond directly to the recommendations, hold net-zero Oxford summit, establish a Zero Carbon Oxford Partnership, create new carbon budgets, provide support for individuals and communities to tackle the climate emergency
Manchester Community Assembly (2021)	Comprehensive Climate Mandate report	The emotional impact of climate change, transport, food and agriculture, fashion and retail, and buildings and energy	2022 refresh for the Manchester City Council's Climate Change Action Plan 2020-25 incorporated content of the Climate Mandate
The Citizen Assembly on Climate (German) (2021)	80 recommendations based on guiding principles on each topic stream	Energy, Mobility, Buildings and Heating, and Food and Agriculture	Limited policy impacts but increased the legitimacy of deliberative democracy and plans to undertake more climate assemblies in the future (Stack and Griessler, 2022).

	Recommendations / Output	Themes	Response
Lebanon Climate Assembly (2020)	No specific ecommendations	Energy justice priorities, the energy mix of future energy production in 2030, improvement of local energy efficie y	No link to governmental institutions
The Kendal Climate Change Citizens' Jury (2021)	24 recommendations	Food and Farming, housing and energy, promoting action and raising awareness, Transport, and other actions (general advice)	Councillors committed to implementing recommendations but were limited in the power and influen e to implement certain recommendations


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5 Methodology

When conducting our literature review, we utilised as systematic rapid impact review methodology to accumulate our key findin s and evidence. We utilised academic tools such as Google Scholar, Primo, Google and the Sortition Foundation to conduct our literature search and used a variation of keywords and exclusion criteria to limit our searches. Forms of deliberation utilise various terminologies and so we used a variety of search terms to capture most, if not all, terms used. These are listed below in the table below. We reviewed various forms of literature in order to produce a review of all forms of literature related to our focus. This included academic literature, grey literature, government documents and news media. Searches were also conducted for citizens' assemblies and deliberation policies specific to climate related issues and wider examples of public deliberation.

Mini publics	Citizens' juries	Citizens' assemblies
Climate assemblies	Deliberative mini publics	Citizens' panel
Peoples' jury	Policy jury	Citizens' initiative review
Consensus conference	Citizens' convention	

We explored fourteen case studies in order to produce richer, in-depth and contextual examples both to test and contribute to findin s of our review. The primary sources used to collate data on our 14 case studies are listed in the table below.

Case Study	Case	Key Source
1	UK Climate Assembly	Climate Assembly UK (2020); Elstub et al. (2021);
2	Scotland Climate Assembly	Scottish Government (2021a); Andrews et al. (2022); Scottish Government (2022)
3	Ireland's Citizens' Assembly	Coleman et al. (2019); The Citizens' Assembly (2018)
4	French Climate Assembly	Courant (2021); Louis-Gautan et al. (2022);
5	Washington Climate Assembly	Washington Climate Assembly (2021)
6	Brighton and Hove Climate Assembly	Carrol et al. (2020); Brighton and Hove City Council (2020)
7	Devon Climate Assembly	Devon City Council (2021); Scott (2021)
8	Global Citizens' Assembly on the Climate and Ecological Crisis	Global Assembly (2022)
9	The North of Tyne Citizens' Assembly on Climate Change	Shared Future (2021a);
10	Oxford Citizens' Assembly on Climate Change	Oxford City Council (2019);
11	Manchester Community Assembly (2021)	Walley (2021)
12	The German Citizen Assembly on Climate	Stack and Grissler (2022); Bürgerrat (2021)
13	Lebanon Climate Assembly	Shehabi and Al-Masri (2022)
14	The Kendal Climate Change Citizens' Jury	Shared Future (2021b)

Case Study Justification

Since climate assemblies are a relatively new concept for making decisions on climate policy, but local and national governments are increasing their use in the process of decision-making. One of the fi st citizen assemblies to incorporate climate policy was the Irish Citizens' Assembly (European Climate Foundation, 2021), making it a suitable example when analysing climate assemblies. When considering which climate assemblies were to be analysed, characteristics of the assemblies were considered to ensure a diverse set. These were characteristics such as scale; whether the assembly was at a local or national level of governance, assemblies such as the Scottish climate assembly being at a national scale in comparison to the Devon Climate Assembly which was undertaken at a much more localised level. The Global Climate Assembly was an interesting example of a climate assembly which was taken at the largest macro level possible. Another characteristic was the availability of breakdown of the design process, helping to give an understanding of how climate assemblies are designed, and best practice involved. When researching potential case studies, we considered the body which set the agenda to be discussed, and whether the agenda was set by the government commissioning the climate assembly or a non- profit charity with experience in running climate assemblies.

A limitation of this review is its focus on mostly countries in the Global North. We were only able to include one case study from the Global South or economically developed countries in this report (Lebanon). Our search tools primarily cover English-speaking sources and deliberative democratic tools on climate originating in Global South might not be as extensively covered in those sources. Most climate assemblies that we found across these regions, did not have published reports or information which we could access to study it in the same rigorous manner as the other case studies included in this report. On occasion, we found examples of civil action regarding the climate that occurred within economically developing countries, but these were informal and therefore, again, could not be analysed in the same way as the other case studies included in this report. Below is a list of the search engines/ databases and search terms we utilised to conduct our search. We reviewed all the hits we received up and including the tenth search page.

Search Engines/Databases		
Primo	Google Scholar	Web of Science
Scopus	Clarivate	ProQuest Ebook Central
Ingenta Connect	JSTOR	

Search Terms	
Less economically developed "countries OR nations" "climate" assemblies assembly LEDC	Less economically developed "countries OR nation" "citizen" assemblies assembly LEDC
"Global south" "climate assemblies OR assembly"	Global south "citizen assemblies OR assembly"
"Deliberative democracy" AND "global south"	"Deliberative democracy" AND "less economically developed countries nations OR LEDC"
"Climate change" AND "deliberative democracy" AND "global south"	"Climate change" AND "deliberative democracy" AND "less economically developed countries OR nations OR LEDC"
"Developing" "nations OR countries" "climate" "assemblies OR assembly"	"Developing" "nations OR countries" "citizen" "assemblies OR assembly"

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